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NO. 50 DECEMBER 2019 Introduction 
The United States and Israel: 
The Risk of Growing Apart 
If Illiberal Democracy Prevails in Israel, the Special Relationship May Not Survive 
Mark A. Heller 
United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s assertion that “the establishment 
of Israeli civilian settlements in the West Bank is not per se inconsistent with inter-
national law” is merely the latest example of how US and Israeli policies have marched 
almost in lockstep since Donald Trump’s inauguration as president. However, the 
United States and Israel have shared an intense and intimate relationship that long 
predates the Trump Administration and goes beyond the chemistry of individual 
leaders. In many respects, in fact, that relationship is unique in American foreign 
relations and uniquely critical to Israeli security. It is grounded in a shared narra-
tive of biblically inspired frontier societies that have gathered in immigrants and refu-
gees, tamed the wilderness, and built liberal democracy. This explains the broadly 
receptive environment in the United States for the message of US-Israeli commonality. 
Nevertheless, the durability of the relationship is not guaranteed. If the societies and 
political cultures of the two countries either continue to develop along parallel, 
illiberal lines or shift simultaneously in a more liberal direction, the connection be-
tween them will be preserved, or even strengthened. However, if they diverge, and 
especially if Israel maintains its rightward drift while America moves in an opposite 
direction, the normative foundation of the relationship will erode, with ominous 
implications for Israel. 
 
Following the inconclusive Israeli election 
of September 17, 2019, President Donald 
Trump did not call Israeli Prime Minister 
Binyamin Netanyahu, either to congratu-
late or to commiserate. In view of the 
ostensibly tight connection between the 
two, Trump was pressed for an explanation. 
In response, he tweeted that the United 
States is tied to Israel the country, not to 
any particular leader or party. That tie 
is indisputable and is manifest in the fact 
that the United States provides the kind 
of alternative strategic depth that Israel 
has always sought in order to compensate 
for its relative lack of territorial and other 
resources needed to blunt threats to its 
security. 
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The Nature of the 
US-Israeli Relationship 
Contrary to popular impression, however, 
the United States was not always Israel’s 
major great power partner. In 1948, as the 
United States applied an arms embargo to 
both sides in the Arab-Israeli War (and 
Great Britain continued to train and supply 
several Arab client armies), it was actually 
the Soviet Union that provided the critical, 
albeit fleeting, support needed to stave off 
Arab attempts to abort the birth of the 
Jewish state. In the 1950s and early 1960s, 
as the Soviet Union turned hostile and the 
United States was at best standoffish, it was 
France that took on the role of Israel’s great 
power patron. It was only after 1967, and 
especially after 1973, that American politi-
cal leadership and American public opinion 
acknowledged a convergence of interests 
and values, which permitted US-Israel ties 
to deepen and broaden. Since then – and 
notwithstanding periodic tensions, primarily 
about differing approaches to Arab-Israeli 
conflicts – the relationship has grown 
more intense and intimate, to the point 
where the two countries share a special 
relationship of the sort that neither Israel 
nor, arguably, the United States has with 
any other foreign partner. 
The benefits of these ties for Israel have 
been undeniable. The United States has 
provided Israel with lavish military assis-
tance (currently amounting to $3.8 billion 
per annum, equivalent to about 1% of 
Israel’s GDP), granted access to advanced 
technologies and weapons systems (64% of 
all Israeli weapons purchases in the period 
2014–2018 were made in the United 
States), and offered participation in joint 
development projects that have helped 
Israel to sustain a qualitative military edge 
over its adversaries. The United States has 
also been a source of real-time resupply 
of military consumables in times of high-
intensity conflict and of considerable intel-
ligence assets. In economic terms, the 
volume of Israel’s trade with the United 
States is larger than that with any other 
single country (though not with the Euro-
pean Union as a whole), and the United 
States is a major source of investment capi-
tal. And diplomatically, the United States 
has provided a political shield against efforts 
of Israel’s adversaries to isolate, sanction, 
and otherwise punish it in international 
fora. Furthermore, the relationship with 
the United States has not only prevented or 
deterred damaging actions by others hostile 
to Israel; Israel’s ties with and putative 
influence in the United States have even 
induced some third parties to cultivate a 
closer relationship with Israel in the hope 
that that link would somehow help im-
prove their own standing in Washington. 
Finally, the United States has been the pri-
mary broker of efforts to contain or resolve 
conflicts with Egypt and Jordan and has 
served as the most reliable intermediary 
from Israel’s perspective in efforts to 
contain/resolve the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict – an agenda item for most American 
presidents over the last four decades. 
For the United States, the political-stra-
tegic benefits that have accrued from this 
relationship are more limited but still note-
worthy. During the Cold War, Israeli power 
helped blunt advances by Soviet clients 
and fortify US-aligned regimes, and Israeli 
battlefield successes allowed the American 
security establishment to enhance its 
understanding of Soviet military technol-
ogies and doctrines. Since the end of the 
Cold War, continuing intelligence exchang-
es and joint development and evaluation of 
new technologies have helped improve the 
American ability to analyze the Middle East 
and respond to military challenges, and not 
only in the field of counter-terrorism. 
It is clear, however, that the strategic ben-
efits of this relationship, while reciprocal, 
are not symmetrical, and the American 
embrace of Israel is explained at least as 
much by common values as by convergent 
interests. The commonalities go beyond 
membership by both in the club of liberal 
democracies; America shares that member-
ship with dozens of other countries in 
the world. Nor do domestic politics explain 
the singularity of the US-Israeli relation-
ship. True, the United States is home to the 
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largest, most prosperous, and most self-
assured Jewish community in the diaspora, 
one which has historically identified strongly 
with Israel and acted to promote American-
Israeli relations. But the United States is 
also home to many other large diasporas, 
and these have also played an important 
role in American “ethnic” politics; some, 
such as Cuban-Americans, for example, 
have influenced US policy vis-à-vis the 
country of their concern, but others, such 
as the “China Lobby,” have registered very 
partial successes, at best. 
In any case, what seems to be unique 
about Israel – and what explains the 
degree to which the message of its advo-
cates resonates with the broader American 
public – is the extent to which its story is 
seen to overlap America’s own. Both coun-
tries see themselves as the executors of 
some exceptional historical mission rooted 
in biblical sources to redeem land and 
people while freeing themselves from the 
undemocratic background of their his-
torical origins. The millenarian idea of 
building “the New Jerusalem” was a com-
mon religious theme in America from the 
17th to 19th centuries, analogous to the 
millenarian theme even among secular 
Zionists of redeeming the Jewish people; 
the original 13 American colonies are 
dotted with towns bearing names taken 
from the Old Testament. It is the perception 
of narrative convergence that has provided 
a broadly receptive environment for the 
message of American-Israeli commonality. 
Absent that environment, it is doubtful 
whether any amount of activism by Jewish 
pro-Israel elements could have produced 
the kind of outcomes characterizing Ameri-
can policy over the past half-century. How-
ever, if that environment changes because 
of changes in the society and political cul-
ture of one or both countries, the narrative 
overlap could be put to a serious test. 
A Changing Israel 
At least part of the convergence – the part 
relating to the culture of liberal democracy 
– has begun to fray. Over the past few 
decades, Israel has witnessed a strengthen-
ing of traditionalist and conservative forces 
inclined to interpret democracy as little 
more than the will of the majority and in-
tent on whittling away at the cultural and 
institutional “obstacles” to the majority’s 
unfettered rule. Such obstacles include 
separation of powers (especially an inde-
pendent judiciary), the rule of law, and 
the protection of basic liberties of speech, 
assembly, religion, and property, as well as 
independent, that is, critical, mass media – 
all underpinned by tolerance, if not respect 
for, minority cultures, interests, and opin-
ions, and for the individual rights and 
liberties of citizens. These features are the 
hardware and software of liberal democracy, 
and if they are undermined – even as the 
consequence of the outcome of free elec-
tions – the result will be illiberal democ-
racy, or “majoritarian authoritarianism.” 
The strengthening of illiberal parties has 
come at the expense of left-wing and secu-
larist forces, and the principal loser in this 
trend has been the Israeli Labor Party in its 
various guises. Labor, when still in the form 
of Mapai (the Israel Workers’ Party), created 
Israel’s pre-state institutions, established 
the state, and dominated its governments 
for the first three decades of the country’s 
existence. Since 1977, however, the Labor 
Party has led or co-led ruling coalitions for 
only 12 years; for the rest of the time, cen-
ter-right or right-wing coalitions have domi-
nated, and the Labor Party and its socialist 
and social-democratic partners have been 
reduced to shells of their former selves. 
This trend certainly reflects a shift 
toward more hardline public attitudes on 
relations with Arab/Muslim adversaries, 
especially the Palestinians – the cumula-
tive result of inconclusive war processes 
and counter-terror campaigns, but also of 
disappointing peace processes. Perhaps 
the single most important inflection point 
came in 2000, when what was widely 
viewed, even by President Bill Clinton, as a 
very forthcoming Israeli proposal that went 
beyond the parameters suggested by Clin-
ton himself, was met, in the view of most 
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Israelis, not by Palestinian acceptance or 
even by continuing negotiations, but rather 
by a protracted campaign of terror that 
included dozens of bombings of civilians, 
causing hundreds of deaths. The experience 
of the “Second Intifada” persuaded many 
Israeli voters that the “peace process” was 
an illusion, enough of one, in fact, to pro-
duce a shift in the center of political gravity 
that has persisted for almost two decades. 
However, the focus on the Israeli-Pales-
tinian conflict tells only part of the story, 
because attitudinal studies over time still 
show greater support for conciliatory 
policies than for the political parties that 
espouse those conciliatory policies. Even in 
2018, years after the “death” of the peace 
process had become conventional wisdom, 
58% of Israeli Jews (and 89% of Israeli Arabs) 
still supported a two-state resolution of the 
conflict, and 62% of Israeli Jews felt that 
Israel’s best option was to strive either for 
a comprehensive agreement with the Pales-
tinians or for transitional agreements 
resulting in separation from the Palestini-
ans. In other words, “the Palestinian issue” 
is not the sole – and perhaps not even 
the central – wedge issue of the left-right 
divide in Israeli worldviews, in general, 
and in voting behavior, in particular. 
Instead, the successes of the right-wing 
bloc are due to a combination of factors. 
The Palestinian issue/peace process is cer-
tainly one of them; it may even be the 
case that the perception that the positions 
adopted by left-wing governments and 
parties abroad (especially in Europe) are 
driven by an anti-Israel animus exposes the 
Israeli left to the criticism that it is a co-
conspirator with its ideological soulmates 
overseas. The extent to which the left can 
be tarred by the European brush is reflected 
in the finding that 51% of Israeli Jews (but 
only 14% of Israeli Arabs) view the Euro-
pean Union as a foe, whereas only 24% 
view it as a friend (as opposed to 48% of 
Israeli Arabs). 
However, in addition to the strengthen-
ing of the nationalist right – whether 
for ideological reasons or security calcula-
tions – there are social changes trending 
in the same direction. One is the persis-
tence of identity politics, coupled with 
growing socio-economic inequality. This 
is not just a question of the “ethnic divide” 
among Israeli Jews. This division, per se, 
has not intensified: “inter-marriage” be-
tween Ashkenazi (European) and Sephardi 
(Eastern) Jews, for example, has actually 
become much more common and socially 
acceptable, and it now accounts for more 
than 20% of all Jewish marriages, as op-
posed to only about 5% in the 1970s. How-
ever, socio-economic inequality has grown 
appreciably in recent decades; from the 
mid-1980s to the late 2000s, Israel’s Gini 
coefficient – measuring the inequality of 
distribution of income after taxes and trans-
fers – rose from 0.326 to 0.371; among the 
36 member countries of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD), only the United States, Chile, 
Turkey, and Mexico had more unequal 
income distribution. Moreover, growing 
socio-economic gaps find expression in 
growing educational gaps; PISA (Programme 
for International Student Assessment) tests 
in 2018 (which did not even include ultra-
Orthodox students, whose independent but 
state-financed school system does not teach 
minimum core curriculum requirements in 
mathematics, science, and English) showed 
that advantaged students outperformed dis-
advantaged students in reading by 121 score 
points (compared with an OECD-wide aver-
age difference of 89 score points), and that 
this performance gap had actually grown 
by 18 score points since 2009 (whereas the 
average OECD performance gap rise in the 
same period had been only two points). 
These inequalities overlap much of the 
residual ethnic divide that still separates 
Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews (not to speak 
of Arabs and Jews as a whole). Among the 
latter, the consequence of all this is often 
a gulf between center and periphery and 
between “the elites” and “the people.” This 
sort of gulf sustains feelings of prejudice 
and victimization and provides fodder for 
political exploitation, including the kind of 
incitement against “the establishment,” the 
left, socialists, foreigners, and minorities 
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frequently seen in other illiberal democra-
cies. A dramatic example of this mindset is 
the complaint of a Likud campaign advisor 
and former speechwriter for Prime Minister 
Netanyahu, more than 40 years after the 
Likud first came to power: “The left set up 
the state and left it in ruins; it left most of 
Israel’s citizens oppressed. Two countries 
were built here – the country of the owners, 
of the hegemony, the elites, and a second 
country of the second-, third-, fourth- and 
fifth-class citizens – and that’s us, the 
majority of the people...” 
A second trend is the “traditionalization” 
of society due to higher birth rates in the 
Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox communities, 
hence the growing electoral weight of reli-
gious voters and the preservation – if not 
enhancement – of the influence of the 
Orthodox/ultra-Orthodox religious estab-
lishment. The average fertility rate of ultra-
Orthodox women is currently 7.1 children 
per woman, as opposed to 4 for modern 
religious women, 2.7 for “traditional” 
women, and 2.1 for secular Jewish women. 
If these patterns continue, the ultra-Ortho-
dox, who are now about 12% of the popula-
tion, will account for 32% of the population 
by 2065. 
The hardening of attitudes toward the 
Palestinians alone could not have produced 
the seemingly durable shift toward right-
wing illiberalism in Israel. Nor could socio-
economic and socio-ethnic polarization 
alone have brought about that result. Even 
religious traditionalization alone could not 
have been a sufficient condition. However, 
though the peculiarities of the proportional 
representation system of elections have 
made it impossible for security hawks, ideo-
logical hawks, national-religious or ultra-
Orthodox streams, or the socio-ethnic 
“dispossessed” from attaining an electoral 
majority on their own, they have encour-
aged the convergence of all these streams 
and produced coalitions marked by sym-
bolic and rhetorical posturing and material 
pandering to the components of the coali-
tions, which the left and center-left, tradi-
tional as well as secular, have been unwill-
ing/unable to accommodate. 
The result has been policy “packages” 
(grand bargains) combining many of the 
following elements: “hardline” positions 
on the Palestinian issue; efforts to constrain 
“judicial activism” (i.e., independent judi-
cial review of the legality/constitutionality 
of actions taken by the executive branch 
and laws enacted by the legislative major-
ity) by means of attacks on the Supreme 
Court for thwarting “the will of the people”; 
attempts to domesticate critical media by 
either corrupting them or delegitimizing 
them (for allegedly helping Israeli’s enemies 
in their campaign to delegitimize the state); 
attacks on the public prosecutor and other 
unelected officials, including even the 
police (for investigating corruption by 
elected officials); attempts to discredit the 
loyalty of the “leftist” opposition; budgetary 
favoritism for religious institutions; acqui-
escence in demands of religious zealots to 
refuse allocation of a mixed-gender prayer 
space at the Western Wall; receptivity to 
conspiracy theories about “the deep state”; 
accommodation of xenophobic sentiments 
(e.g., attempts to deport grown Israeli-born 
children of foreign workers); and passage 
of a Nationality Law that changes virtually 
nothing in the material reality of the coun-
try but articulates preferential symbolic 
status to Jews. 
It must be added that many of these 
attempts have been thwarted by legal and/ 
or political opposition, and none of the 
trend lines identified here, even the demo-
graphic one, is unstoppable. In fact, there 
are some signs of growing pushback, in-
cluding massive demonstrations against a 
proposed Immunity Law that would have 
shielded a serving prime minister from 
prosecution for criminal acts, and rejection 
of a proposed Override Clause that would 
have allowed the Knesset to nullify Su-
preme Court rulings – not to speak of two 
recent elections that denied victory to the 
partners of the illiberal coalition. Israel 
remains a vibrant democracy, but unless 
the trends identified here are reversed, 
Israel will remain at risk of its ethnic 
democracy being turned into ethnic chau-
vinism, of being pulled further away from 
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the liberal socio-political principles in 
which it is historically grounded, and of 
being transformed into a populist polity 
that is intolerant of minorities or political 
opposition of any kind. 
A Changing America? 
At first glance, there is little here that 
would seem to distinguish Israel from simi-
lar developments in the United States. After 
all, America also seems to be moving in the 
direction of illiberal democracy and popu-
list nationalism in recent years. Donald 
Trump appears to have tapped a deep vein 
of American nativism and isolationism that 
goes back at least as far as the Know Nothing 
movement of the 1850s, and as president, 
he seems to be leading America away from 
its liberal tradition, in terms of both domes-
tic politics and international order. America, 
too, has been experiencing growing socio-
economic inequalities of the sort that ap-
pear to encourage illiberal populism. There 
is therefore no prima facie reason to con-
clude that American-Israeli commonality is 
diminishing, and that intimacy between the 
two countries is therefore likely to decline. 
On the contrary, parallel trends in the two 
countries might actually tighten the ties. 
This is exactly what has happened since 
2017. Notwithstanding some remaining dif-
ferences, such as attitudes toward Turkey, 
American endorsement of Israeli policy and 
American actions that are consistent with 
Israeli government objectives on the Pales-
tinian question and other regional issues, 
especially Iranian nuclear ambitions and 
cultivation of ties between Israel and the 
Arab Gulf states, have reached unprece-
dented levels. That kind of complementarity 
could well continue if both countries either 
maintain their present political vector or 
else change direction more or less simul-
taneously. 
However, there is a distinct possibility 
that trend lines in the coming years will not 
move in parallel fashion but will actually 
begin to diverge, and that gaps between the 
two countries will begin to widen in many 
spheres. Theoretically, Israel and the United 
States could begin to march to different 
drummers if Israel pivots in a more liberal 
direction and the United States maintains 
its populist course, at least in the near term. 
After all, most polls show Trump retaining 
the bulk of his supporters from the 2016 
election, and the main economic indicators, 
especially unemployment, which political 
pundits insist are the most important pre-
dictors of election outcomes, appear to be 
working in his favor. Nevertheless, of the 
two possible causes of divergence, the more 
likely one is that Israel will continue to 
evolve over the foreseeable future as it has 
(with a few deviations) in the recent past, 
but that the United States will change course. 
There are several reasons why this is so. 
First of all, the shift that has taken place in 
the United States is neither as pronounced 
nor as prolonged as the one in Israel. In-
deed, the “illiberal” American shift that 
took place in 2016 is something of a quirk 
of the electoral system and also something 
of an optical illusion, because most of its 
manifestations are championed by a can-
didate who lost the popular vote and are 
not necessarily supported by public opin-
ion. In fact, the rhetoric of illiberalism has 
so far outpaced actions of domestic or inter-
national illiberalism; NAFTA was abolished 
but replaced by NAFTA-II; NATO was de-
clared “obsolete” but then the declaration 
was declared “obsolete”; the Border Wall 
was announced but not actually built; entry 
of Muslims into the country was banned 
and then the ban was reversed; the with-
drawal of American troops in Syria was 
loudly proclaimed and quietly reversed. 
Secondly, there is an established pattern 
of fluctuation between “left” and “right” in 
American politics, and every time someone 
explains why a fundamental and durable 
change has taken place, the thesis is almost 
immediately discredited by an electoral 
reversal. In fact, this is frequently evidenced 
almost immediately in mid-term congres-
sional elections – including those of 
2018 – where the normal pattern has been 
for the incumbent president’s party to lose 
some strength, as if the electorate is trying 
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to remind him or her not to get carried 
away. Israel has no such tradition. 
Thirdly, the federal system and the con-
stitutional separation of powers and par-
allel electoral systems (for chief executive 
and legislature, as well as for state govern-
ments) in the United States provide a some-
what greater check on executive power 
because, in the case of clearly hostile public 
opinion, legislators can more easily sepa-
rate their own political destinies from that 
of the head of government. The constitu-
tional separation of state and religion in 
America, hence, the absence of any estab-
lished religious authority, also means that, 
however pious Americans may be in their 
personal beliefs, their political system is not 
subject to the “traditionalizing” influence 
of a religious establishment with formal 
powers. 
Finally, to the extent that demographic 
factors do play a role in determining the 
political texture of society, the sector most 
identified with the “illiberal democracy” 
allegedly ushered in after 2017 – white, 
non-Hispanic voters (lacking higher edu-
cation) – is already diminishing in propor-
tional terms and will begin to decline in 
absolute numbers in 2030. In many critical 
states, non-Hispanic whites are already in 
the minority, and many projections suggest 
that before 2045, Trump’s main linguistic-
racial constituency will be a minority in the 
entire country. 
All these factors are highly relevant 
for the quality of American relations with 
Israel. A “liberal” swing of the pendulum 
in the United States, unless accompanied by 
a similar swing in Israel, may well produce 
an American government of a different tex-
ture, one less favorably disposed to Israel, 
even if there is no lingering resentment of 
the way in which both Trump and Netan-
yahu have become identified with the 
transformation of US-Israeli relations into 
a partisan issue. The Republicans have 
certainly tried to do this, but the extent to 
which they succeed depends at least in part 
on the Democratic response. Centrist Demo-
cratic presidential candidates – those run-
ning to the middle – are trying to resist, 
but their efforts are not universally endorsed. 
Many of the constituencies of “liberalism,” 
at least as embodied in the Democratic Party 
of the 21st century, have less of an affin-
ity with Israel’s historical narrative, and 
some – to judge by the explicit preferences 
of a few in the radical wing of the Demo-
cratic Party, and even by the content of 
debates in the 2019 Democratic presidential 
primary campaigns – are prepared to advo-
cate changes in the quality of the bilateral 
relationship that had previously been voiced 
only infrequently in the mainstream of the 
American political discourse. 
Moreover, the changing composition of 
the American electorate will not eliminate 
the core of voters attached by emotive links 
to Israel, especially among evangelicals, 
but there will be larger numbers of voters 
with no religious or ethno-national roots 
in Israel’s identity and history and among 
whom Israel’s narrative is less resonant. To 
cite just one dramatic example of the change: 
60 years ago, Hubert Humphrey, a vigorous 
supporter of Israel, was one of the senators 
from Minnesota; today, Ilhan Omar, perhaps 
the fiercest opponent of Israel in Congress, 
is a representative from the same state. 
Furthermore, barring a change in the 
vector of Israeli society and politics, Israel 
may not even be able to count on the degree 
of support from the American Jewish com-
munity to which it has become accustomed. 
The majority of American Jews are com-
mitted liberals, and some exhibit growing 
signs of discomfort with the illiberalism of 
Israeli governments in recent years, not just 
with respect to “the peace process,” but also 
with respect to domestic politics. For exam-
ple, the majority of those affiliated with 
some stream of American Judaism (them-
selves only about two-thirds of American 
Jews) are members of Conservative or Re-
form congregations, precisely those streams 
subject to dismissive comments and dis-
criminatory practices by the Chief Rabbin-
ate in Israel. Moreover, as the immediacy 
of the Holocaust fades with the passage of 
time, so, too, does emotional identification 
with Israel’s raison d’être. Consequently, 
younger generations of Jews may well come 
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to feel less identified with, and committed 
to, Israel than were their parents or grand-
parents. Criticizing Israeli policy has long 
been commonplace. But in recent years, 
even more radical Jewish voices have been 
raised, identifying with extreme left-wing, 
anti-Semitic movements that question 
Israel’s essential legitimacy. These voices 
are still truly marginal, amounting, by one 
estimate, to no more than about 3% of the 
Jewish community. Nevertheless, a recent 
poll shows that 51% of Israeli Jews already 
feel that US Jews are not supportive enough. 
Other things being equal, the alienation of 
American Jews from Israel may well inten-
sify in the future. 
Conclusions 
In short, many of the traditional founda-
tion stones of an intimate American-Israeli 
relationship may be subject to weakening 
or erosion. There is nothing in the foresee-
able future to suggest a complete discon-
nect, much less the transmogrification of 
the United States into a hostile adversary. 
Israel and the United States will continue to 
share important interests that can underlie 
a strong transactional relationship, even 
more than during the Cold War, when the 
United States felt the need to compete with 
the Soviet Union for the alignment of Arab 
and Muslim states. After all, it is possible 
for two countries, even without any con-
vergence of narratives, to retain strong 
bilateral ties based on transactional ben-
efits. This is clear from the example of US-
Turkish relations. Despite the absence of 
any congruence in either their personal 
or their national stories, President Barack 
Obama, a liberal democrat by almost any 
criterion, felt no compunction about claim-
ing that Turkish President Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, an illiberal democrat by almost 
any reckoning, was one of the foreign 
leaders with whom he could share friend-
ship and “bonds of trust.” 
Nor do the risks of a loosening of ties 
include the withdrawal of a guarantee of 
direct American intervention in Israel’s 
defense in extremis; that has never been 
a formal part of the relationship, and it is 
something that Israel has never requested 
or needed – in part precisely because of 
the magnitude of American assistance, 
short of physical presence. Still, the erosion 
of the relationship, even if incremental, 
would have potentially serious consequences 
for the military, diplomatic, and economic 
security of the country, and that risk in-
heres in the degree to which Americans 
looking into the Israeli “mirror” come to 
see less and less of themselves. 
Israeli leaders have always striven to 
avoid international isolation and invested a 
great deal in public diplomacy. They have 
also factored anticipated reactions of others, 
especially the United States, into discrete 
foreign and security policy decisions. How-
ever, although domestic politics have often 
influenced these calculations (as they do 
everywhere), the degree to which “purely” 
domestic political decisions affect the quality 
of foreign relations has not been sufficiently 
appreciated. In fact, since chains of causality 
run in both directions, the entire distinction 
between domestic and international politics 
and security may be an artificial construct. 
That does not mean, of course, that any 
actor can easily shape any other society’s 
political structure or political culture. In 
almost all instances, any influence that may 
inhere in a relationship is marginal and in-
cremental rather than determinative – but 
not inconsequential for all that. Therefore, 
since the United States is such a central fac-
tor in Israel’s wellbeing, the need to main-
tain some kind of narrative convergence 
ought to be a compelling reason for Israelis 
to pay more attention to the international 
ramifications of their “domestic” politics. 
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